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This article is a summary of the legal landscape faced by those holding patents 
that recite a method of using a medical device in the United States. The analysis is 
limited to medical devices and does not pertain to pharmaceutical drugs. 
According to the Food and Drug Administration (FDA), a medical device is: 
[A]n instrument, apparatus, implement, machine, contrivance, 
implant, in vitro reagent, or other similar related article, including 
any component, part, or accessory which is . . . (2)intended for use 
in the diagnosis of disease or other conditions, or in the cure, 
mitigation, treatment, or prevention of disease, in man or other 
animals, or (3)intended to affect the structure or any function of the 
body of man or other animals, and which does not achieve its 
primary intended purposes through chemical action within or on 
the body of man . . . and which is not dependent upon being 
metabolized for the achievement of its primary intended purposes.1 
Medical devices are regulated by the FDA, and can also be patentable subject 
matter.2 The FDA rules regarding medical devices include restrictions and 
requirements on labeling, instructions for using the medical device, and requests 
for permission to market the medical device, among others.3 A company looking 
to market a medical device that falls into certain categories defined by the FDA4 
must get FDA approval before marketing the device.5 The idea is that the FDA is 
a sort of screen that filters out possibly harmful medical devices and insures that 
the medical devices that are ultimately used will not cause unwanted harm. 
Doctors and hospitals are typically the customers of the entities that pursue 
patents reciting methods of using a medical device, thus making the calculation of 
whether or not to sue more difficult for the patent holder. One alternative is to try 
                                                      
1 21 U.S.C. § 321(h) (2006). It is noteworthy that under the FDA's definition a placebo is 
considered a medical device. 
2 21 C.F.R. § 807 (2006) (“Manufacturers . . . of medical devices must register their 
establishments with the FDA.”); see also Device Advice: Comprehensive Regulatory Assistance, 
U.S. FOOD AND DRUG ADMINISTRATION (FDA), 
http://www.fda.gov/MedicalDevices/DeviceRegulationandGuidance/default.htm (last visited Feb. 
16, 2013). 
3 See 21 C.F.R. § 807.87.E (2012). 
4 Overview of Device Regulation, FDA, 
http://www.fda.gov/MedicalDevices/DeviceRegulationandGuidance/Overview/default.htm (last 
visited Feb. 16, 2013). 
5 See 21 C.F.R. § 807 (2012). 
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and recover damages for induced or contributory infringement.6 With these 
considerations in mind, investors and inventors of patents reciting methods of 
using a medical device should exercise more caution than those looking to invest 
in or pursue other patented methods. This is especially true when the medical 
device required to carry out the steps in the method of use patent is in the public 
domain or patented by a different party. The reasons for this are fleshed out in this 
article. The article utilizes a simple hypothetical situation throughout to help 
illuminate the issues faced by the “method of using a medical device” patent 
holder. The simple hypothetical revolves around two entities (Edison and 
Morse),7 a medical device (catheter), and a patented method of using the catheter 
assigned to one of the entities (Edison). 
First, the article begins by reviewing FDA approval procedures,8 labeling 
requirements,9 and instructions for use requirements.10 Second, the article 
discusses a history of induced infringement11 and a review of induced 
infringement before and after the recent Supreme Court decision in Global-Tech 
Appliances, Inc. v. SEB S.A. and the Federal Circuit decision in Akamai 
Technologies, Inc. v. Limelight Networks, Inc.12 Third, the article reviews the 
scope of immunity from infringement under 35 U.S.C. § 271(e)(1).13 Fourth, the 
article continues with a discussion of off-label use generally,14 liability for off-
label use with promotion,15 and liability for off-label use without promotion, 
including a discussion of preemption of state tort claims related to FDA approved 
devices and the FDA approval process.16 Fifth, the article addresses the issue of 
whether applying for and obtaining FDA approval is considered an act of 
infringement.17 Interspersed throughout the article is an analysis of what the 
substantive conclusions mean for the hypothetical situation involving Morse, 
Edison, the catheter, and Edison’s method of using the catheter.18 The article 
                                                      
6 See 35 U.S.C. § 271(b)–(c) (2006) (defining induced infringement and contributory 
infringement, respectively); see also infra Part III (discussing induced infringement in detail).  
7 All characters and events in this article, even those based on real people, are entirely 
fictional. 
8 See infra Part II.  
9 See infra Part II.A–B. 
10 See infra Part II.C. 
11 See infra Part III. 
12 See infra Part III.A. 
13 See infra Part III.B. 
14 See infra Part IV. 
15 See infra Part IV.A. 
16 See infra Part IV.B. 
17 See infra Part V. 
18 See infra Part II.A (“Approval to Market Edison’s Method of Using a Catheter”); see also 
infra Part. II.D (“Edison Files His 510(k) Application”); see also infra Part. III.D (“What 
Inducement to Infringe and 35 U.S.C. § 271(e)(1) Mean to Morse and Edison”); see also infra Part 
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concludes with a summary of the substantive conclusions reached,19 and some 
ways the effects of the problems uncovered might be curbed.20 
Edison is now on his way to get FDA approval for a method of using the 
catheter. Let us briefly review what Edison must do to get approval and what 
Edison will gain if he gets FDA approval for a method of using the catheter. 
II. BRIEF REVIEW OF FDA APPROVAL PROCEDURES FOR MEDICAL DEVICES 
The FDA utilizes general controls, special controls, pre-marketing controls, 
and post-marketing regulatory controls to regulate medical devices.21 The FDA 
groups medical devices into three classes based on the risk the device presents to 
a patient.22 The level of risk determines the level of regulatory control the FDA 
deems necessary.23 Thus, the class of device (Class I, II, or III) is a dominant 
factor in determining what regulations must be adhered to by the entity seeking 
approval to market the device.24 In the case of a new medical device, the 
regulatory standards to be used can be decided by comparing the device to other 
similar, previously legally marketed, medical device classifications and devices 
with the same technological characteristics.25 
The FDA classifies medical devices into three categories: 1) Class I, lowest 
risk to the patient and lowest regulation; 2) Class III, high risk to the patient and 
highest amount of regulation; and 3) Class II which falls somewhere between 
Class I and Class III in both risk and level of regulation.26 
Class I devices are typically simple in design and are “not intended for use in 
supporting or sustaining life or to be of substantial importance in preventing 
impairment to human health, and they may not present a potential unreasonable 
                                                                                                                                                   
IV.C (“What Off-Label Use Means for Morse”); see also infra Part V.A (“Enjoining Morse 
Through a Declaratory Judgment Suit”). 
19 See infra Part V. 
20 See infra Part VI. 
21 See Device Advice, supra note 2; see also FD&C Act Chapter V: Drugs and Devices, FDA, 
http://www.fda.gov/RegulatoryInformation/Legislation/FederalFoodDrugandCosmeticActFDCAct
/FDCActChapterVDrugsandDevices/default.htm (last visited Feb. 16, 2013). 
22 PMA Approvals, FDA, 
http://www.fda.gov/medicaldevices/productsandmedicalprocedures/deviceapprovalsandclearances
/pmaapprovals/default.htm (last visited Feb. 16, 2013). 
23 See id. 
24 See Classifying Your Medical Device, FDA, 
http://www.fda.gov/MedicalDevices/DeviceRegulationandGuidance/Overview/ClassifyYourDevi
ce/default.htm (last visited Nov. 19, 2012). 
25 Overview of Device Regulation, supra note 4. 
26 Id. 
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risk of illness or injury.”27 A majority of Class I devices are “exempt from pre-
market notification and/or good manufacturing practices regulation.”28 
Class II devices are usually subject to special controls like special labeling 
requirements, mandatory performance standards, post-market surveillance, and 
FDA medical device specific guidance.29 Class II devices are also typically 
required to satisfy the pre-market notification requirement with a submission of a 
21 C.F.R. § 510(k) (510(k)) clearance to market submission.30 
The FDA typically requires those desiring to market a Class III medical 
device to submit Pre-Market Approval31 documentation.32 
A. Approval to Market Edison’s Method of Using a Catheter 
To receive approval to market a method of using a medical device, the 
requisite medical device determines the type of submission that is required. In 
Edison’s case, a catheter fits the FDA’s definition of a medical device33 that does 
not emit radiation.34 The method of using the device is assumed to reside in Class 
                                                      
27 General Controls For Medical Devices, FDA, 
http://www.fda.gov/MedicalDevices/DeviceRegulationandGuidance/Overview/GeneralandSpecial
Controls/ucm055910.htm (last visited Feb. 16, 2013). 
28 General and Special Controls: Class I — General Controls, FDA, 
http://www.fda.gov/MedicalDevices/DeviceRegulationandGuidance/Overview/GeneralandSpecial
Controls/default.htm (last visited Feb. 16, 2013). 
29 General and Special Controls: Class II — Special Controls, FDA, 
http://www.fda.gov/MedicalDevices/DeviceRegulationandGuidance/Overview/GeneralandSpecial
Controls/default.htm#class_2 (last visited Feb. 16, 2013). 
30 See id. Some Class II devices are exempt from this submission. See 21 C.F.R. § 862–92 
(2006), for a list of exempt devices. 
31 The details of Pre-Market Approval (PMA) are outside the scope of this paper. For more 
details of PMA, see General and Special Controls: Class III — Premarket Approval, FDA, 
http://www.fda.gov/MedicalDevices/DeviceRegulationandGuidance/Overview/GeneralandSpecial
Controls/default.htm#class_3 (last visited Feb. 16, 2013). 
32 See id. Some Class III devices are only required to submit a 510(k) for clearance to market. 
Id. 
33 See supra note 1 and accompanying text; see also 21 U.S.C. § 321(h) (2006) (“The term 
“device” . . . means an instrument, apparatus, implement, machine, contrivance, implant, in vitro 
reagent, or other similar or related article, including any component, part, or accessory, which is—
(1) recognized in the official National Formulary, or the United States Pharmacopeia, or any 
supplement to them, (2) intended for use in the diagnosis of disease or other conditions, or in the 
cure, mitigation, treatment, or prevention of disease, in man or other animals, or (3) intended to 
affect the structure or any function of the body of man or other animals, and which does not 
achieve its primary intended purposes through chemical action within or on the body of man or 
other animals and which is not dependent upon being metabolized for the achievement of its 
primary intended purposes.”). 
34 21 U.S.C. § 360(hh) (2006) (defining radiation as: “(A) any ionizing or non-ionizing 
electromagnetic or particulate radiation, or (B) any sonic, infrasonic, or ultrasonic wave, which is 
6
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II. Edison’s method of using a catheter happens to require a 510(k) submission 
(since his patent is a method of using an already existing catheter he can “piggy-
back” off the approval of the catheter),35 including submitting satisfactory 
proposed labels with sufficient directions for use.36  The FDA also requires a 
statement comparing the device to other comparable devices.37 
B. FDA Labeling Requirements 
Under the FDA’s labeling requirements,38 Edison will need to adhere to the 
requirements relating to in vivo diagnostic product labeling.39 Among the 
requirements that Edison must satisfy are the labeling requirements for the 
immediate container, inserts, and outer packaging.40  
Another requirement pertinent to patent law includes an adequate statement of 
the directions for use.41 If anyone in the chain of distribution intends the device 
for uses different from those uses intended by those “up-stream” in the chain of 
distribution, then these parties must furnish adequate labeling for the new 
                                                                                                                                                   
emitted from an electronic product as the result of the operation of an electronic circuit in such 
product.”). 
35 How to determine whether YOUR medical device requires 510(k) submission, EMERGO 
GROUP INC., http://www.fda510k.com/file/fda_510k_steps_1_thru_7.pdf (last visited Feb. 16, 
2013). 
36 See 21 C.F.R. § 807.87(e) (2012) (listing information required in a premarket notification 
submission). There is no standard application form for a 510(k) submission, but instructions are 
provided at 21 C.F.R. §§ 807.87–807.95 (2012). 
37 Labeling: Regulatory Requirements for Medical Devices, FDA, at 16 (Aug. 1989), 
http://www.fda.gov/downloads/MedicalDevices/DeviceRegulationandGuidance/GuidanceDocume
nts/UCM095308.pdf. 
38 21 C.F.R. § 801 (2012). 
39 Id. 
40 Id.; see also Labeling: Regulatory Requirements for Medical Devices, supra note 37, at 12–
13. Example requirements for labeling on the immediate container include the name of the 
product; the intended use; warnings or precautions for users listed in 16 C.F.R. § 1500; name and 
place of business of the manufacturer, packer, or distributor; and lot or control number traceable to 
product history. Id. Labeling requirements for inserts and outer packaging must include the 
product name; intended use of the product and whether it is a qualitative or quantitative type of 
procedure; a summary of the test including methodology, special merits, and limitations of the 
test; and the scientific principles of the procedure. Id. In the case of an instrument, the outer 
packaging must also include the use or function, installation procedures and requirements, 
principles of operation, performance characteristics and specifications, operating instructions, 
calibration procedure, operational precautions and limitations, hazards, and service and 
maintenance information, among others. Id. at 13. 
41 Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act § 502(f)(1)–(2), 21 U.S.C. § 352(f) (2006); 21 C.F.R. § 
801.5 (2012) (“Adequate directions for use means directions under which the layman can use a 
device safely and for the purposes for which it is intended.”); see also infra Part II.C. 
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intended use.42 Also, in the case of a manufacturer that knows, or has information 
indicating that the device is to be used in ways other than that which the 
manufacturer is seeking approval, the manufacturer is required to provide 
adequate labeling in accordance with such other uses.43 On its face, the rule seems 
to require one who becomes aware of off-label uses of his product to provide 
instructions or warnings regarding the newly discovered use of the product; 
however, at least one court has not found this to be the case.44 In Riley v. Cordis 
Corp., the District Court of Minnesota held that 21 C.F.R. § 801.4 does not 
require a manufacturer to provide instructions for use or warnings for uses that the 
manufacturer became aware of after FDA approval was granted for a different 
use.45 The court reasoned that the FDA did not intend 21 C.F.R. § 801.4 to pre-
empt their stringent restrictions on altering labels.46 In other words, the Riley court 
concluded that in order to harmonize the FDA's rules, 21 C.F.R. § 801.4 cannot be 
viewed as creating an affirmative duty to change labeling in accordance with uses 
that the manufacturer becomes aware of after getting FDA clearance.47 
C. Directions for Use, Indications and Usage, and Intended Use Requirements 
The FDA requires most applicants to submit materials regarding “adequate 
directions for use,” “indications for use,” and “intended use.”48 Edison will have 
to include all of these requirements in his submission to satisfy his 510(k) labeling 
submission requirement.49 Directions for use include statements of all purposes 
for which the device is intended, and route or method of applying the device, 
                                                      
42 21 C.F.R. § 801.4 (2012) (stating that if the intended use changes after introduction into 
“interstate commerce,” then “such packer, distributor, or seller is required to supply adequate 
labeling in accordance with the new intended uses”). 
43 Id. (“But if a manufacturer knows . . . that a device introduced into interstate commerce by 
him is to be used for conditions, purposes, or uses other than the ones for which he offers it, he is 
required to provide adequate labeling for such a device which accords with such other uses to 
which the article is to be put.”). 
44 See Riley v. Cordis Corp., 625 F. Supp. 2d 769, 782 (D. Minn. 2009). 
45 See id. (“It seems highly unlikely that . . . § 801.4 was forcing manufacturers who knew of 
off-label uses of their devices but did not promote those off-label uses to provide instructions or 
warnings.”). 
46 See id. 
47 See id. (“It would make no sense to impose on manufacturers who were not promoting off-
label uses of their devices a duty to instruct or warn, but to impose no such duty on manufacturers 
who were promoting off-label uses. The existence of this statutory scheme at the time relevant to 
this action strongly suggests that § 801.4 did not impose additional labeling requirements on 
manufacturers of Class III devices when those manufacturers become aware of off-label uses of 
their products.”) (emphasis in original). 
48 See 21 C.F.R. § 801.4–5 (2012). 
49 See Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act § 502(f), 21 U.S.C. § 352(f) (2006). 
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among others.50 The indications and usage submission, while not explicitly 
required in the 510(k) submission, has been a requirement under a substantial 
equivalence submission, and requires an accurate statement of the intended 
actions of the device.51  
D. Edison Files His 510(k) Application 
Edison diligently and accurately begins preparing his 510(k) device 
submission; this requires more than a nominal amount of time, money, and 
effort.52 It turns out that Edison does not have the capital required to fully prepare 
the 510(k) submission or perform all of the tests necessary to attain the data 
needed for FDA submission. To this end, he creates a sales pitch that he presents 
to investors to try and get the investors to invest in his method of using the 
catheter. As the backbone of his pitch, Edison uses the fact that he attained 
exclusionary rights through his method of use patent. He also states that he has 
the ability to sue for direct infringement if the entity infringing is not exempt from 
suit for infringement. Finally, he pitches that he may have a case for indirect 
infringement if the direct infringer is exempt from suit. His pitch is successful and 
he acquires an investor to invest sufficient, and substantial,53 capital to fund the 
FDA submission. With sufficient capital in hand Edison works with FDA medical 
device regulation specialists, label manufacturers, and packaging specialists, just 
to name a few, in perfecting his 510(k) submission. Edison files the FDA report 
and is surprised to find that his submission goes through without a hitch and he is 
cleared to market his patented in vivo method of using a catheter. Now Edison is 
granted the ability to legally market and distribute his product to the general 
public. 
It turns out that Edison’s method of using the catheter is a huge success. In 
fact, Edison’s method is so much of a success that Morse decides that trying to 
piggyback on Edison’s success in the catheter market could be quite lucrative for 
him too. If Morse could just get one method of using a catheter approved for 
marketing and distribution, he could sell the catheter to hospitals, which could 
                                                      
50 21 C.F.R. § 801.5 (2012) (“Adequate directions for use means directions under which the 
layman can use a device safely and for the purposes for which it is intended.”). 
51 Id. § 801.4. 
52 JOSH MAKOWER ET AL., FDA IMPACT ON U.S. MEDICAL TECHNOLOGY INNOVATION: A 
SURVEY OF OVER 200 MEDICAL TECHNOLOGY COMPANIES 6–8 (Nov. 2010). In a report prepared 
by Stanford University researchers, with support from the Medical Device Manufacturers 
Association, National Venture Capital Association, and multiple state medical industry 
organizations, it was reported that it took about ten months from filing to clearance and about $24 
million on FDA dependent and related activities. Id. 
53 Id. 
9
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then use the catheter for any use,54 including the incredibly popular method of 
using the catheter that is patented and FDA approved by Edison. Further, Morse 
knows that he could even use Edison’s 510(k) application submission to help him 
gain FDA approval. Morse would find it ideal if he could submit a 510(k) 
essentially identical to Edison’s submission and be granted the ability to distribute 
the catheter in virtually the same way as Edison, including the same instructions 
for use and labeling. However, in Morse’s quest to determine if he is able to 
piggyback on Edison’s FDA approval for Edison’s patented method of using a 
catheter without liability, which would definitely be possible if Edison did not 
have his method of use patent, Morse discovered a form of legal liability known 
as induced infringement.  
III. BRIEF HISTORY OF INDUCED INFRINGEMENT 
Prior to the 1952 Patent Act, no statute defined infringement.55 In addition, 
Congress wanted to replace some of the existing patent case law that attempted to 
define infringement.56 To this end, Congress took the opportunity to provide a 
statutory definition of indirect infringement.57 Prior to 1952 there existed direct 
infringement and contributory infringement. The former was the unauthorized 
making, using, or selling of a patented invention. The latter was anything that was 
not technically direct infringement, but where a defendant displayed sufficient 
culpability to be held liable as an infringer (typically joint and several liability as 
a tortfeasor with a primary infringer).58 Pre-1952 contributory infringement 
concerned mostly components that were built with no other use but an infringing 
one, where the component had no use outside of a use with an infringing product 
or process.59 The Patent Act of 1952 split contributory infringement into 
                                                      
54 See infra Part IV. 
55 Mark A. Lemley, Inducing Patent Infringement, 39 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 225, 227 (2005) 
(“Indeed, it was not until the Patent Act of 1952 that the idea of active inducement was separated 
from the offense of contributory infringement. That statute codified a prohibition against 
contributory infringement in section 271(c) and against inducement in section 271(b).”) (footnotes 
omitted). 
56 See 5 R. CARL MOY, MOY’S WALKER ON PATENTS § 15:2 (4th ed. 2012). 
57 See id. § 15:10; see also 35 U.S.C. § 271(b)–(c) (2006) (“(b) Whoever actively induces 
infringement of a patent shall be liable as an infringer. (c) Whoever offers to sell or sells within 
the United States or imports into the United States a component of a patented machine, 
manufacture, combination or composition, or a material or apparatus for use in practicing a 
patented process, constituting a material part of the invention, knowing the same to be especially 
made or especially adapted for use in an infringement of such patent, and not a staple article or 
commodity of commerce suitable for substantial noninfringing use, shall be liable as a 
contributory infringer.”).  
58 See 5 MOY, supra note 56, §§ 15:1, 15:10. 
59 See Soonbok Lee, Induced Infringement as a Strict Liability Claim: Abolishment of the 
Specific Intent Requirement, 4 HASTINGS SCI. & TECH. L.J. 381, 399 (2012) (“It must be noted that 
10
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contributory infringement and active inducement of infringement, and these 
methods of infringing became what are now known as indirect infringement.60 
Post 1952 infringement has been governed generally by 35 U.S.C. § 271(a) 
which states that the United States will impose liability on one who makes, uses, 
sells, or offers to sell an invention set out in a patent.61 35 U.S.C. § 271 continues 
by providing two other ways that one can be held liable for infringement: (1) by 
inducing another to infringe and (2) by contributing to the infringement of another 
by providing articles that are not staples of commerce.62 Thus, a cause of action 
for induced infringement is provided under 35 U.S.C. § 271(b), which states 
simply, when one “actively induces infringement of a patent [they] shall be liable 
as an infringer.”63 As 35 U.S.C. § 271(b) is short and not detailed, there has been 
a significant body of case law on the topic of what exactly § 271(b) 
encompasses.64 
A. Induced Infringement Before and After Global-Tech Appliances v SEB S.A.65 
The induced infringement statute simply states that “[w]hoever actively 
induces infringement of a patent shall be liable as an infringer.”66 Induced 
infringement, as liability for an act of joint tortfeasance, requires an act of direct 
infringement in order to establish liability.67 This direct infringement can be 
                                                                                                                                                   
a contributory infringer defined in § 271(c) is presumed to have specific intent or express purpose 
to cause another's infringement under the pre-1952 case law because he sells products which are 
specially adapted to a patent infringement.”). 
60 See 5 MOY, supra note 56, § 15:10 (“The provisions, particularly paragraph (c), set out a 
relatively detailed statement of when liability is to exist, and leave comparatively little room for 
additional case law development. The legislative history is replete with indications that Congress 
sought to replace the existing case law to some extent.”). 
61 35 U.S.C. § 271(a) (2006). 
62 Id. § 271(b)–(c). 
63 Id. § 271(b). 
64 See, e.g., Global-Tech Appliances, Inc. v. SEB S.A., 131 S. Ct. 2060, 2069 (2011) (noting 
that willful blindness is sufficient to determine intent in induced infringement cases); Tegal Corp. 
v. Tokyo Electron Co., 248 F.3d 1376, 1378–79 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (“‘Actively inducing,’ . . . 
requires an affirmative act of some kind.”); Beverly Hills Fan Co. v. Royal Sovereign Corp., 21 
F.3d 1558, 1569 (Fed. Cir. 1994) (“[J]urisdiction here cannot be based on a tortious omission, 
since active inducement of infringement requires the commission of an affirmative act.”) 
(emphasis in original). 
65 Global-Tech, 131 S. Ct. 2060. 
66 35 U.S.C. § 271(b) (2006). 
67 See Met-Coil Sys. Corp. v. Korners Unlimited, Inc., 803 F.2d 684, 687 (Fed. Cir. 1986). 
The notion that an act of direct infringement is required for one to be liable for inducement was 
revisited in Akamai Technologies, Inc. v. Limelight Networks, Inc., 692 F.3d 1301 (Fed. Cir. 2012) 
(en banc), which is discussed below. See also infra Part III.B. 
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proven by direct testimony or circumstantial inference.68 In general, inducing 
infringement requires a purposeful intent that direct infringement occurs, and that 
actual steps are taken to aid the direct infringement.69 Plaintiffs claiming induced 
infringement must also show that the defendant had threshold knowledge and 
purposefully intended that the infringement occur.70 Prior to the Global-Tech 
decision in May of 2011, it was unclear whether an induced infringement 
defendant must have known of the patent at issue prior to the inducing acts in 
order to be held liable.71 Also, before the Global-Tech decision, it was accepted 
that the threshold knowledge requirement was satisfied if a defendant to an 
induced infringement claim knew or should have known that their acts would 
result in another entity infringing a patent.72 The lower court in the Global-Tech 
case held that a deliberate indifference to a patent’s existence is equivalent to 
actual knowledge of the patent’s existence.73 The Supreme Court clarified that it 
is not enough to show that a defendant to an induced infringement suit knew that 
there was a chance that the activities could violate a patent but paid no attention to 
the risk.74 Instead, an induced infringement plaintiff must show that the defendant 
knew that the person being induced would violate the patent.75 However, the 
Court utilized the doctrine of willful blindness to reach the same decision as the 
lower court76 and officially endorsed use of the doctrine of willful blindness in 
civil suits for induced patent infringement.77 
                                                      
68 See 5 MOY, supra note 56, § 15:15; see also Liquid Dynamics Corp. v. Vaughan Co., 449 
F.3d 1209, 1219 (Fed. Cir. 2006) (stating that direct infringement can be proved by direct as well 
as circumstantial evidence). 
69 See Beverly Hills, 21 F.3d at 1569 (stating that inducement cannot be premised on an 
omission because “active inducement” under 35 U.S.C. § 271(b) requires “an affirmative act”). 
70 See Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 125 S. Ct. 2764, 2779 (2005). 
71 See Global-Tech Appliances, Inc. v. SEB S.A., 131 S. Ct. 2060 (2011). 
72 SEB S.A. v. Montgomery Ward & Co., 594 F.3d 1360, 1376 (Fed. Cir. 2010), cert. 
granted, 131 S. Ct. 458 (2010), aff'd sub nom., Global-Tech Appliances, Inc. v. SEB S.A., 131 S. 
Ct. 2060 (2011). 
73 See SEB S.A., 594 F.3d at 1377. 
74 Global-Tech, 131 S. Ct. at 2068–72. 
75 Id. at 2067–69. 
76 Id. at 2068–72. 
77 Id. at 2068–69 (“The doctrine of willful blindness is well established in criminal law. Many 
criminal statutes require proof that a defendant acted knowingly or willfully, and courts applying 
the doctrine of willful blindness hold that defendants cannot escape the reach of these statutes by 
deliberately shielding themselves from clear evidence of critical facts that are strongly suggested 
by the circumstances. The traditional rationale for the doctrine is that defendants who behave in 
this manner are just as culpable as those who have actual knowledge.”). 
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B. Induced Infringement Before and After Akamai Technologies, Inc. v. Limelight 
Networks, Inc.78 
Direct infringement (infringement under 35 U.S.C. § 271(a)), as a strict 
liability tort, requires a single actor to perform all the steps of a patented method 
either personally or vicariously to find liability.79 Induced infringement gives rise 
to liability only if the inducement leads to a direct infringement.80 A method claim 
is infringed only if each and every step of the claimed method is performed.81  
In BMC Resources, Inc. v. Paymentech, L.P., the Federal Circuit held that to 
find induced infringement the inducement must give rise to a direct infringement 
and the infringement must be committed by a single actor.82 The Federal Circuit 
in Akamai Technologies, Inc. v. Limelight Networks, Inc. recognized that the 
result of BMC would immunize from liability a party (1) who performs some of 
the steps of a patented method themself and induces another to carry out the 
remaining steps83 or (2) who induces multiple parties to collectively perform each 
and every step of the patented method.84 However, a party who induces a single 
person to carry out all the steps would generally not be immunized from 
liability.85 The Federal Circuit overturned the BMC decision recognizing that: 
If a party has knowingly induced others to commit the acts 
necessary to infringe the plaintiff's patent and those others commit 
those acts, there is no reason to immunize the inducer from liability 
for indirect infringement simply because the parties have 
structured their conduct so that no single defendant has committed 
all the acts necessary to give rise to liability for direct 
infringement.86 
                                                      
78 692 F.3d 1301 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (en banc). 
79 See BMC Res., Inc. v. Paymentech, L.P., 498 F.3d 1373, 1379, 1381 (Fed. Cir. 2007); see 
also Muniauction, Inc. v. Thomson Corp., 532 F.3d 1318, 1330 (Fed. Cir. 2008). 
80 See Deepsouth Packing Co. v. Laitram Corp., 406 U.S. 518, 526 (1972); see also Aro Mfg. 
Co. v. Convertible Top Replacement Co., 365 U.S. 336, 341 (1961). 
81 See Akamai Technologies, Inc. v. Limelight Networks, Inc., 692 F.3d 1301, 1307 (Fed. Cir. 
2012) (en banc).. 
82 BMC Res., 498 F.3d at 1379. 
83 Akamai Technologies, 692 F.3d at 1305 (citing to Akamai Technologies, Inc., v. Limelight 
Networks, Inc., 614 F. Supp. 2d 90 (D. Mass. 2009), aff'd, 629 F.3d 1311 (Fed. Cir. 2010), 
vacated, 419 F. App'x 989 (Fed. Cir. 2011), and rev'd and remanded, 692 F.3d 1301 (Fed. Cir. 
2012) (en banc)). 
84 Akamai Technologies, 692 F.3d at 1305 (citing to McKesson Info. Solutions LLC v. Epic 
Sys. Corp., 2009 WL 2915778 (N.D. Ga. 2009)). 
85 See Akamai Technologies, 692 F.3d at 1309. 
86 Id. 
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Thus, the Akamai decision helps protect those with a patented method 
in an important way—by making it possible to find indirect infringement 
liability in some situations where multiple parties carry out some steps of 
the patented method and the combination of their actions add up to 
carrying out all steps of the patented method.87 
C. Exemption Under 35 U.S.C. § 271(e)(1) 
There is an exemption to infringement that shields uses of a patented 
invention that are reasonably related to the development and submission of 
information to federal agencies.88 This exception was enacted by the legislature in 
response to vigorous lobbying on behalf of generic drug manufacturers to reverse 
the opinion in Roche Products, Inc. v. Bolar Pharmaceutical Co.89 By enacting 
this statute, Congress reduced the rights of patent holders by permitting 
competitors to engage in acts that would reasonably generate data the FDA would 
use, thus reducing patent holders’ sales in order to protect health care interests.90 
The exception also allows possible competitors to be poised and ready to enter the 
marketplace as soon as the patent expires.91 Without this exception a patent holder 
whose patentable subject matter was also subject to the requirements of the FDA 
would be given a de facto patent extension. This is because gathering data for 
safety and efficacy study submissions to the FDA could only be possible after the 
patent term has expired. Thus, the patent holder would be granted a period of time 
where the patent is no longer enforceable yet no competitors have been able to 
enter the market yet, because the FDA has not cleared their product.92 
Gathering safety and efficacy data reasonably related to submission to the 
FDA is now a well-known activity that is exempt from infringement liability.93 
                                                      
87 See id. 
88 35 U.S.C. § 271(e)(1) (2006) (“It shall not be an act of infringement to make, use, offer to 
sell, or sell within the United States or import into the United States a patented invention (other 
than a new animal drug or veterinary biological product (as those terms are used in the Federal 
Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act and the Act of March 4, 1913) which is primarily manufactured 
using recombinant DNA, recombinant RNA, hybridoma technology, or other processes involving 
site specific genetic manipulation techniques) solely for uses reasonably related to the 
development and submission of information under a Federal law which regulates the manufacture, 
use, or sale of drugs or veterinary biological products.”). 
89 Intermedics, Inc. v. Ventritex, Inc., 775 F. Supp. 1269, 1276 (N.D. Cal. 1991). 
90 Id. at 1276–77. 
91 Id. at 1277. 
92 See Abtox, Inc. v. Exitron Corp., 122 F.3d 1019, 1029 (Fed. Cir. 1997). 
93 See Merck KGaA v. Integra Lifesciences I, Ltd., 545 U.S. 193 (2005); Eli Lilly & Co. v. 
Medtronic, Inc., 496 U.S. 661 (1990); Telectronics Pacing Sys., Inc. v. Ventritex Inc., 982 F.2d 
1520 (Fed. Cir. 1992); Chartex Int’l PLC v. M.D. Pers. Prods. Corp., No. 92-1556, 5 F.3d 1505 
(Fed. Cir. 1993) (unpublished opinion). 
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Specifically, activities that have been held to be reasonably related to gathering 
safety and efficacy data for submissions to the FDA include: (1) displaying 
necessary information for clinical testing at trade shows in order to facilitate the 
clinical trial, including obtaining clinical investigators;94 (2) performing consumer 
studies that provide information for the design of the product to be approved, 
including studies on the clarity of usage instructions;95 (3) raising funds to cover 
the costs of submitting information to the federal agency;96 (4) manufacturing the 
infringing product when most of the products manufactured are used to generate 
data for the submission;97 (5) informing customers that the product will soon be 
commercially available;98 and (6) selling the device at cost to obtain data on the 
device’s operation in clinical trials.99 Also, data gathered from safety and efficacy 
studies required for submission to the FDA are not restricted to use only in the 
submission to the FDA; the data can be used, for example, for fund raising and 
other business purposes.100 Further, the actions of an infringer are not necessarily 
outside the exemption because, for example, the otherwise infringing uses either 
failed to generate information in which a federal agency was interested or 
generated more information than turned out to be necessary to secure FDA 
approval.101 
The standard used to determine if the actions are reasonably related to a 
federal agency submission is whether it would have been objectively reasonable 
for a party, in the alleged infringer's situation, to believe that there was a decent 
prospect that the “use” in question would directly contribute to the generation of 
kinds of information that are likely to be relevant in processes by which the 
federal agency would rely on when deciding whether to approve the product.102 It 
is important to note that the exemption does not necessarily terminate with the 
submission of information to the federal agency, so long as it is objectively 
reasonable for the company in the alleged infringer's position to believe that 
continued data gathering would, relatively directly, contribute to the generation of 
                                                      
94 Telectronics Pacing Sys., 982 F.2d at 1523 (“[S]uch demonstrations constitute an exempt 
use reasonably related to FDA approval, because device sponsors are responsible for selecting 
qualified investigators and providing them with the necessary information to conduct clinical 
testing.”). 
95 Chartex Int’l, No. 92-1556, at *3, 5 F.3d 1505. 
96 Intermedics, 775 F. Supp. at 1281. 
97 Id. at 1282. 
98 Abtox, Inc. v. Exitron Corp., 888 F. Supp. 6 (D. Mass. 1995), aff'd, 122 F.3d 1019 (Fed. 
Cir. 1997), and opinion amended on reh'g, 131 F.3d 1009 (Fed. Cir. 1997). 
99 Intermedics, 775 F. Supp. at 1289. 
100 Telectronics Pacing Sys., Inc. v. Ventritex Inc., 982 F.2d 1520, 1525 (Fed. Cir. 1992). 
101 Merck KGaA v. Integra Lifesciences I, Ltd., 545 U.S. 193, 207 (2005); Intermedics, 775 F. 
Supp. at 1280. 
102 See Merck, 545 U.S. at 200. 
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a kind of data relevant to the federal agency’s inquiry.103 This gives those seeking 
FDA approval considerable leeway to engage in infringing activities especially 
since it can be difficult to determine what types and quantities of information will 
be required to attain the FDA’s approval.104 
 D. What Inducement to Infringe and 35 U.S.C. § 271(e)(1) Mean to Morse and 
Edison 
The Federal Circuit and the United States Supreme Court seem to be moving 
in the direction of further protecting patented methods as is illustrated by the 
Global Tech and Akamai cases. Edison is excited that courts expanded liability for 
inducement to infringe to include multiple parties carrying out the method. 
However, these expansions do not deter Morse who is excited about the prospect 
of being able to take a catheter and use it to do some clinical testing and 
promotion, including clinical testing on Edison’s patented method of using the 
catheter, and be protected from infringing by 35 U.S.C. § 271(e)(1). While Morse 
would very likely not be able to legally market the device for Edison’s patented 
method of use without actively inducing infringement105 until the patent expires, 
he can still pursue approval for Edison’s method of use and not be liable to 
Edison as long as he stands behind the shield of 35 U.S.C. § 271(e)(1). 
While this is not ideal to Morse, since he cannot enter the market until 
Edison’s patent expires,106 he is still excited to know that he can have 
conversations about the approval that he is seeking from the FDA and the data he 
is gathering for approval in order to secure financial backing, obtain clinical 
investigators, and manufacture some catheters. Morse knows that all of this 
activity will undercut some of Edison’s sales of the catheter in the process, since 
Edison currently has a monopoly on the patented method. 
Expectedly, Morse does not want to wait twenty years for the patent to expire 
to enter the market and start seeing cash flow. To this end, he does a little research 
into off-label use to see if he can sell the same catheter that Edison’s popular 
method of use requires, but label it for a different method of use, even though his 
                                                      
103 Intermedics, 775 F. Supp. at 1282. 
104 Id. at 1280 (“[I]t will not always be clear to parties setting out to seek FDA approval for 
their new product exactly which kinds of information, and in what quantities, it will take to win 
that agency’s approval.”); see also 21 C.F.R. § 312.22(b) (2012) (“The amount of information on 
a particular drug that must be submitted . . . depends upon such factors as the novelty of the drug, 
the extent to which it has been studied previously, the known or suspected risks, and the 
development phase of the [product].”). 
105 See infra Part V (discussing how FDA submissions and requirements have been used as 
evidence in infringement suits). 
106 See infra Part V (discussing how FDA submissions and requirements have been used as 
evidence in infringement suits). 
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secret goal is to sell the device knowing that the people he is selling to will use 
the device for Edison's patented method. 
IV. OFF-LABEL USE 
The FDA has never had the power to regulate the practice of medicine;107 it 
merely has authority to regulate the introduction of medical devices into the 
commercial market.108 To make certain that the FDA is not allowed to interfere 
with the practice of medicine, Congress enacted legislation stating that the FDA 
shall not “limit or interfere with the authority of a health care practitioner to 
prescribe or administer any legally marketed device to a patient for any condition 
or disease within a legitimate health care practitioner-patient relationship.”109 
It has been said that off-label uses of medical devices (using a device for some 
other purpose than that for which it has been granted FDA approval) is an 
accepted and necessary corollary of the FDA’s mission to regulate in the area of 
commercial medical devices without directly interfering with the practice of 
medicine.110 The Supreme Court recognized this notion by noting that off-label 
use promotes the mission of the FDA.111 Further, the FDA itself recognizes the 
value of off-label uses.112 
The acceptance of off-label uses in the medical community stems from the 
knowledge that not every use of a medical device beneficial to the practice of 
medicine will be scrutinized by the FDA for approval. Certain approaches to 
utilizing medical devices may only be reported on extensively in medical 
literature, and new uses for FDA approved medical devices are often discovered 
                                                      
107 See In re Orthopedic Screw Prods. Liab. Litigation, MDL No. 1014, 9408-0002, 1996 WL 
107556, at *3 (E.D. Pa. 1996) (“[T]he ‘decision whether or not to use a drug for an off-label 
purpose is a matter of medical judgment[,] not of regulatory approval.’”) (alteration in original) 
(quoting Klein v. Biscup, Nos. 68615, 68659, at *13 (Ohio Ct. App. Feb. 15, 1996)). 
108 See Regulation of Medical Devices: Background Information for International Officials, 
FDA, 
http://www.fda.gov/MedicalDevices/DeviceRegulationandGuidance/GuidanceDocuments/ucm070
958.htm#1 (last visited Feb. 16, 2013). 
109 21 U.S.C. § 396 (2006). 
110 See Buckman Co. v. Plaintiffs' Legal Comm., 531 U.S. 341, 350 (2001); James M. Beck & 
Elizabeth D. Azari, FDA, Off-Label Use, and Informed Consent: Debunking Myths and 
Misconceptions, 53 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 71, 76–77 (1998) (noting that the “FDA itself recognize[s] 
the value and propriety of off-label use”). 
111 Buckman, 531 U.S. at 350. 
112 12 FDA DRUG BULLETIN: USE OF APPROVED DRUGS FOR UNLABELED INDICATIONS 4–5 
(1982), available at http://www.circare.org/fda/fdadrugbulletin_041982.pdf (“Once a product has 
been approved for marketing, a physician may prescribe it for uses or in treatment regimens or 
patient populations that are not included in approved labeling.”).. 
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through opportune observations and innovations.113 Public acceptance of off-label 
use is further justified on the grounds that by allowing physicians greater freedom 
to practice medicine patients are given treatment at lower costs because requiring 
FDA approval for all treatments would require significant time and money to 
achieve approval, thereby driving up the cost of the treatment.114 Acceptance of 
off-label use is further bolstered by the myriad of illnesses and disease with 
popular off-label treatments, including cancer, heart disease, AIDS, kidney 
disease, and osteoporosis.115 To illustrate the extent to which off-label use has 
permeated the practice of medicine, some studies suggest that off-label uses make 
up twenty-five to sixty percent of all prescriptions written each year.116  
A. Court Enforced Liability of Off-Label Use with Promotion 
If the FDA finds that a company is promoting their product for an unapproved 
use, they can take civil and criminal action, with penalties including payment of 
large fines and enjoinment of marketing activities.117 While the FDA can give 
hefty fines to a manufacturer for promoting its product for an off-label use,118 the 
liability of the manufacturer may not end there. Courts recognize a potential 
liability for a manufacturer’s negligence in promoting its product for a non-
approved use.119 
In Sita v. Danek Medical, Inc., the defendant was charged with negligence for 
the promotion of an off-label use of a bone screw.120 The plaintiff alleged that the 
                                                      
113 Id. 
114 N.J. STAT. ANN. § 26:1A-36:9(g) (West 2012) (“‘Off-label’ use of FDA-approved drugs 
provides efficacious drugs at a lower cost. To require that all appropriate uses of a drug undergo 
approval by the FDA may substantially increase the cost of drugs and delay or even deny patients' 
ability to obtain medically effective treatment. FDA approval for each use would require 
substantial expenditure and time to undergo the clinical trials necessary to obtain FDA approval.”) 
115 See Beck & Azari, supra note 110, at 80. 
116 See id. 
117 In re Orthopedic Cone Screw Prod. Liab. Litigation, 159 F.3d 817, 828 (3d Cir. 1998) 
(“[A] device cleared under § 510(k) cannot lawfully be marketed for a use other than the use 
specified in the clearance. Thus, if such a device is marketed for another purpose, the 
manufacturer may be civilly and criminally sanctioned and the marketing enjoined.” (citing 21 
U.S.C. § 331–332 (2006))); see also FDA News Release: FDA Fines American Red Cross $16 
Million for Prior Failures to Meet Blood Safety Laws, FDA, 
http://www.fda.gov/NewsEvents/Newsroom/PressAnnouncements/ucm216156.htm (last visited 
Feb. 16, 2013).  
118 21 U.S.C. § 331 (2006) (“The following acts and the causing thereof are hereby prohibited: 
(a) The introduction or delivery for introduction into interstate commerce of any food, drug, 
device, or cosmetic that is adulterated or misbranded.”). 
119 See Sita v. Danek Med., Inc., 43 F. Supp. 2d 245, 262 (E.D.N.Y. 1999); see also Proctor v. 
Davis, 682 N.E.2d 1203, 1215 (Ill. App. Ct. 1997). 
120 See Sita, 43 F. Supp. 2d at 263. 
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defendants promoted the off-label use by funding seminars, textbooks, and 
universities to teach off-label procedures using the bone screws.121 The court 
stated: 
To prevail, plaintiff must establish that [the doctor] was influenced 
by illegal marketing efforts which, in effect, made the use of [the 
bone screws] . . . in the pedicles of the spine so prevalent that the 
off-label use of such screws became the standard of care in [the 
doctor’s] medical community.122  
The court held that the plaintiff’s evidence was sufficient to overcome 
summary judgment on this issue; however, under the informed intermediary 
doctrine123 no reasonable jury could conclude that the doctor’s continued use of 
the bone screws was caused by defendant’s promotion.124 
To contrast, in Proctor v. Davis, the Illinois Court of Appeals found that a 
manufacturer participated in and encouraged the providing of misleading 
information about its drug to hospital staff.125 This finding relied on evidence that 
the defendant gave financial support and drug supplies to the hospital staff, as 
well as made contributions to journal articles.126 Further, the court noted that the 
manufacturer is held to the standard of an expert, and since the manufacturer 
knew of the use in question, promoted the use, failed to warn against the dangers 
of such a use, and the medical community did not know of the risks of using the 
product at the time the injury in question was incurred, the manufacturer had a 
duty to warn of the risks associated with the use and was liable for the injuries 
caused by the off-label use.127 
At this point it is unclear what actions are required by courts to hold someone 
liable for promoting their product for off-label use. However, it is known that 
there must be a causal connection between the manufacturer’s actions and the 
physician’s actions. This connection is generally required to be strong due to the 
medical profession’s independence and presumed expertise.  
                                                      
121 See id. 
122 Id. 
123 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PROD. LIAB. § 6(d) (1998) (“A prescription drug or 
medical device is not reasonably safe due to inadequate instructions or warnings if reasonable 
instructions or warnings regarding foreseeable risks of harm are not provided to: (1) prescribing 
and other health-care providers who are in a position to reduce the risks of harm in accordance 
with the instructions or warnings . . . .”). 
124 Sita, 43 F. Supp. 2d at 264. 
125 Proctor v. Davis, 682 N.E.2d 1203, 1211–12 (Ill. App. Ct. 1997). 
126 Id. at 1208. 
127 Id. at 1214. 
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B. Do Courts Hold Liability for Off-Label When One Knows of the Use but 
Doesn’t Promote the Use? 
The issue of whether a manufacturer can be held liable for a use of its product 
that is off-label, even when the manufacturer did not promote its product for the 
use that caused the injury was addressed in Davenport v. Medtronic, Inc.128 The 
plaintiff in Davenport suffered from Parkinson’s disease and had a tremor control 
system surgically implanted that ultimately did not control the tremors he suffered 
from.129 The plaintiff sued for negligence, breach of implied and express 
warranties, and strict product liability.130 In deciding whether the claims were 
capable of surviving summary judgment, the court first determined whether the 
claims were preempted by 21 U.S.C. § 360(k).131 The court concluded that the 
only claim preempted by the Medical Device Amendments (MDA) was the 
implied warranty of merchantability claim,132 because the defendant utilized the 
FDA’s Pre-Market Approval (PMA) process in getting privileges to market the 
product,133 the FDA imposed specific federal requirements relating to the 
product,134 and the accepted standards of design and manufacture for products in 
the state would be different from, or in addition to, the requirements imposed by 
the FDA.135 In disposing of the remainder of the claims, the court reasoned that 
the plaintiff has not demonstrated that the device in question violates the federally 
                                                      
128 Davenport v. Medtronic, Inc., 302 F. Supp. 2d 419, 426 (E.D. Pa. 2004). 
129 See id. at 427. 
130 Id. at 428. 
131 21 U.S.C. § 360(k) (2006) is part of the Medical Device Amendments (MDA) to the 
Federal Food, Drug, Drug, and Cosmetic Act (“[N]o state or political subdivision of a State may 
establish or continue in effect with respect to a device intended for human use any requirement-- 
(1) which is different from, or in addition to, any requirement applicable under this chapter to the 
device, and (2) which relates to the safety or effectiveness of the device or to any other matter 
included in a requirement applicable to the device under this chapter.”). 
132 Davenport, 302 F. Supp. 2d at 442. 
133 Id. at 432. 
134 Id. at 434. 
135 Id.; see also Medtronic, Inc., v. Lohr, 518 U.S. 470, 512 (1996) (upholding the notion that 
a 510(k) doesn’t have preemptory power). The notion that a PMA application has preemptive 
power, while a 510(k) application does not, was later upheld in Riegel v. Medtronic, Inc., 552 U.S. 
312, 323–25 (2008), where the Court answered two questions. First, did the FDA establish 
requirements applicable to Medtronic’s catheter? Id. at 321–22. And, second, if so, does the 
plaintiff’s common-law claims rely upon any requirement of state law that is different from or in 
addition to the FDA’s requirements? Id. at 323. In answering the second question, the Court 
distinguished Lohr, where the Court concluded that a 510(k) substantial equivalence determination 
did not establish requirements for the device in question from the present case on the grounds that 
the PMA process used in the present case established specific requirements for the manufacture of 
the catheter in question. See id. at 323–30. 
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imposed regulations in some way.136 Notably, this test is consistent with the tests 
used by other districts in similar cases.137 
In Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr, the Supreme Court held that “the ‘substantial 
equivalence’ provision [of a 510(k) submission does] not pre-empt the 
[defendant’s] design [defect] claims.”138 The Court, however, left open whether 
PMA approval would have preemptory power under 21 U.S.C. § 360(k). 
The Supreme Court had a chance to visit the issue of whether PMA approval 
would have preemptory power139 in the case of Riegel v. Medtronic, Inc.140 In 
Riegel, the plaintiff had a catheter, subjected to FDA approval through the PMA 
process, rupture in his coronary artery while undergoing heart surgery.141 The 
plaintiff sued for breach of implied warranty, negligence, and strict liability.142 
Unlike the court in Davenport, the Court in Riegel determined that the claims 
were not based on the defendant’s violation of federal law, but instead were based 
on general common law tort liability.143 The Court then determined that the state 
tort negligence, breach of implied warranty, and strict liability claims were all 
preempted by the MDAs to the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetics Act.144 
In summary, a 510(k) application has no preemptory power on state tort 
liability claims under 21 U.S.C. § 360(k), but a PMA does have such preemptory 
power if the claimant is not claiming that the defendant violated a federal 
regulation. 
                                                      
136 Davenport, 302 F. Supp. 2d at 435–37. 
137 See Brooks v. Howmedica, Inc., 273 F.3d 785, 799 (8th Cir. 2001) (“[The plaintiff] has 
presented no evidence that [the manufacturer] violated federal regulations or refused to add 
warnings drafted by the FDA, changed FDA-approved labels failed to meet regular reporting 
requirements, [or] failed to report a known hazard to the FDA . . . .”); see also Kozma v. 
Medtronic, Inc., 925 F. Supp. 602, 603 (N.D. Ind. 1996) (“Defendant has offered considerable 
proof that it complied with FDA regulations in every aspect of the design, manufacture and 
labeling of its pulse generator and leads. This evidence is sufficient to shift the burden to the 
Plaintiffs to produce evidence that the Defendant had not complied with FDA regulations in 
manufacturing the specific pacemaker involved in this case.”). 
138 Lohr, 518 U.S. at 494. 
139 The effect of holding that the PMA process has preemptory power would be a bar to state 
common-law claims that challenge the effectiveness or safety of a medical device marketed in a 
form that received premarket approval from the FDA. See Riegel, 552 U.S. at 316. 
140 Id. at 312. 
141 Id. at 320. 
142 Id. at 320, 330 (“The District Court held that the MDA pre-empted the [plaintiffs’] claims 
of strict liability; breach of implied warranty; and negligence . . . . The Second Circuit affirmed.”). 
143 Id. at 328. 
144 See id. at 326–29. 
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In cases where a court determines that the claims are not preempted by the 21 
U.S.C. § 360(k) learned intermediary doctrine, the requirement that the physician 
read or rely on an affirmative statement of the manufacturer can be used to bar a 
plaintiff from relief.145 Some courts have even gone so far as to suggest that a 
manufacturer will not be liable in the case of an inadequate warning if the 
physician knew of the risk.146 Another noteworthy holding is that claims alleging 
that a defendant made misrepresentations to the FDA are preempted under the 
FDA.147 
C. What Off-Label Use Means for Morse 
The proof that a plaintiff must provide to be successful on a claim for 
manufacturer negligence, namely, demonstrating that the physician relied on the 
manufacturer’s statements in their decision to perform off-label treatments, and 
that the physician did not have independent knowledge of a risk that an adequate 
warning would have communicated, is quite a high threshold to meet. This, 
combined with the courts’ willingness to uphold the learned intermediary 
doctrine, the MDA’s preemption clause interpretation by the Supreme Court, and 
many courts requiring proof that a physician would rely on a warning if a warning 
were given, create a high bar for holding a defendant liable absent proof of 
promoting an off-label use. If a defendant has promoted the off-label use, courts 
would be more likely to hold the defendant liable. However, the proof that has 
been required to hold the defendant liable is still quite high because of the 
assumed independence and expertise of the medical profession. 
Since Morse is using the 510(k) process, he needs to be careful not to promote 
his catheter for an off-label use, because the 510(k) approval process has no state 
                                                      
145 See Talley v. Danek Med., Inc., 179 F.3d 154, 162–64 (4th Cir. 1999) (utilizing the learned 
intermediary doctrine to bar the plaintiff from relief in a failure-to-warn case where the plaintiff 
was injured by a doctor who was using a bone screw for an off-label use).  
146 See Beale v. Biomet, Inc., 492 F. Supp. 2d 1360, 1365 (S.D. Fla. 2007) (“‘[F]ailure of the 
manufacturer to provide the physician with an adequate warning of the risks associated with a 
prescription product is not the proximate cause of a patient’s injury if the prescribing physician 
had independent knowledge of the risk that the adequate warning should have communicated.’” 
(quoting Christopher v. Cutter Labs., 53 F.3d 1184, 1192 (11th Cir. 1995))); Motus v. Pfizer, 196 
F. Supp. 2d 984, 995–98 (C.D. Cal. 2001) (stating that the plaintiff failed to prove that the 
prescribing physician would have acted differently had an adequate warning been made); Minisan 
v. Danek Med., Inc., 79 F. Supp. 2d 970, 978 (N.D. Ind. 1999) (“[E]ven if the manufacturer 
provides inadequate information . . . the manufacturer will not be liable if the plaintiff’s physician 
independently knew of the risks and failed to advise the plaintiff.” (citing Wheat v. Sofamor, 
S.N.C., 46 F. Supp. 2d 1351, 1362 (N.D. Ga. 1999))). 
147 Riley v. Cordis Corp., 625 F. Supp. 2d 769, 777 (D. Minn. 2009) (“So, for example, a 
state-law claim that the defendant made misrepresentations to the FDA is preempted because such 
a claim would not exist absent the federal regulatory scheme established by the FDCA.” (citing 
Buckman Co. v. Plaintiffs’ Legal Comm., 531 U.S. 341, 352–53 (2001))). 
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tort claim preemptory power. Notwithstanding that, Morse can promote his device 
for one use, but the use that he promotes does not limit what a physician does 
with the device. If Morse knows about his catheter being used for Edison’s 
patented, off-label method, he should adhere to some safe practice guidelines to 
avoid promoting the off-label use. If he takes steps, like training employees on 
only the FDA approved methods of use, keeping promotional materials strictly 
limited to the approved method of use, and keeping any documents or advertising 
and promotional materials free from references to off-label uses, he will likely not 
have to worry about his activity being suspicious or leading to liability. 
Morse is also excited about the prospect of possibly being able to indirectly 
fund entities and endeavors that educate about off-label uses of his catheter 
without being liable to anyone, like the manufacturers in Sita.148  
Further, Morse can feel relatively safe from liability for fraud on the FDA. His 
intent to sell the catheter, while knowing that it will be used for Edison’s patented 
method of use, will likely never become known after he has received approval 
from the FDA, because the claim will either be preempted, or the burden of proof 
required for liability would likely be too high to attain. 
At this point things are looking up for Morse. While all this is pretty good 
news, it still isn’t enough for Morse who needs to know how far he can go before 
he is liable to Edison for his actions. Morse knows that the clinical trial exception 
in 35 U.S.C. § 271(e)(1) was enacted to allow competitors to enter the 
marketplace as soon as a patent expires, and he would like to be poised to market 
the catheter for Edison’s patented use as soon as Edison’s patent expires. To this 
end, Morse is wondering how far in advance of the expiration of Edison’s patent 
might he be able to get FDA approval, without being held liable for infringement.  
V. IS SIMPLY OBTAINING FDA APPROVAL SUFFICIENT FOR INDUCED 
INFRINGEMENT LIABILITY? 
The labels, instructions for use, and indications and usage sections of the FDA 
requirements have all been used as evidence of the intent to encourage a direct 
infringement.149 These FDA requirements have also been used as evidence to 
                                                      
148 See Sita v. Danek Med., Inc., 43 F. Supp. 2d 245, 263, 265 (E.D.N.Y. 1999). 
149 See Wyeth v. Sandoz, Inc., 703 F. Supp. 2d 508, 521 (E.D.N.C. 2010) (“The instructions 
on Sandoz’s label and Sandoz’s submission . . . is undisputed circumstantial evidence of Sandoz’s 
specific intent to induce the direct infringement of doctors, pharmacists, and patients.”); Abraxis 
Bioscience, Inc. v. Navinta, LLC, 640 F. Supp. 2d 553, 570–71 (D.N.J. 2009) (“Statements in a 
package insert that encourage infringing use of a drug product are alone sufficient to establish 
intent to encourage direct infringement.” (citing AstraZeneca LP v. Apotex, Inc., 623 F. Supp. 2d 
615 (D.N.J. 2009))), rev’d, 625 F.3d 1359 (Fed. Cir. 2010). 
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establish actual infringement.150 Also, communications with the FDA and product 
literature associated with an FDA submission have been used as evidence 
concerning whether infringement has occurred.151 However, actual infringement 
remains a requirement for liability to be held in induced infringement cases.152 
Since medical devices are generally not subject to the Hatch-Waxman 
Amendments,153 which state that simply filing an Abbreviated New Drug 
Application (ANDA) can itself be an act of infringement, the filing of an 
application to the FDA under 510(k) or PMA requirements is not in and of itself 
sufficient to support a claim for infringement of a method of using a medical 
device.154  
A. Enjoining Morse Through a Declaratory Judgment Suit 
In Sierra Applied Sciences, Inc. v. Advanced Energy Industries, Inc., the 
Federal Circuit stated their test for upholding a declaratory judgment action to 
enjoin a potential infringer from acting.155 The two part test requires “both (1) an 
explicit threat or other action . . . which creates a reasonable apprehension on the 
part of the declaratory plaintiff that it will face an infringement suit, and (2) 
present activity which could constitute infringement or concrete steps taken with 
the intent to conduct such activity.”156 
In Telectronics Pacing Systems, Inc. v. Ventritex, Inc., the Federal Circuit 
affirmed a district court's decision that a declaratory judgment action to enjoin a 
potential future infringer was not immediate enough when the future infringer had 
                                                      
150 See Bayer Schera Pharma AG v. Sandoz, Inc., 741 F. Supp. 2d 541, 548 (S.D.N.Y. 2010) 
(“The ‘Indications and Usage’ section of . . . [the] FDA-approved label . . . . [Make clear that] the 
FDA has not approved the method-of-use set forth in the [patent].”); Purdue Pharma L.P. v. 
Boehringer Ingelheim GmbH, 98 F. Supp. 2d 362, 378 (S.D.N.Y. 2000) (“[T]he Roxane Package 
Insert states, ‘For control of severe chronic pain in patients, this drug should be administered on a 
regularly scheduled basis, every 12 hours.’ On these bases, the Court finds that Roxicodone SR 
satisfies the final limitation of Claim 2 of the ‘912 patent.”) (citation omitted). 
151 See Bayer Schera Pharma AG, 741 F. Supp. 2d at 548 (“[T]he FDA's letter approving 
Bayer's NDA for Yasmin, make clear—as a matter of law—that the FDA has approved Yasmin 
only for use as an oral contraceptive.”). 
152 See DSU Med. Corp. v. JMS Co., 471 F.3d 1293, 1304 (Fed. Cir. 2006); see also Gen. 
Surgical Innovations, Inc. v. Origin Medisystems, Inc., No. 99-1382, 99-1390, 250 F.3d 761 (Fed. 
Cir. 2000) (unpublished opinion); Abraxis, 640 F. Supp. 2d at 570–71. 
153 See Eli Lilly & Co. v. Medtronic, Inc., 496 U.S. 661, 678 (1990) (noting that 35 U.S.C. § 
271(e)(1) was enacted as a result of the Hatch-Waxman amendments and is an important 
exception to the rule that medical devices are not covered under the Hatch-Waxman amendments). 
154 See Telectronics Pacing Sys., Inc. v. Ventritex, Inc., 982 F.2d 1520, 1525–27 (Fed. Cir. 
1992). 
155 363 F.3d 1361, 1373 (2004). 
156 See id. (citing BP Chems. Ltd. v. Union Carbide Corp., 4 F.3d 975, 978 (Fed. Cir. 1993)). 
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just begun clinical trials.157 Part of the court's reasoning relied on the fact that the 
approval applied for is not always what ultimately gets approved for marketing.158 
So the question becomes, at what point in the FDA approval process do the 
requirements necessary to sustain a declaratory judgment action against a 
potential future infringer become satisfied, if ever? 
District courts have cautioned that “subjecting the defendants to an 
infringement litigation . . . may run afoul of the Congressional policy underlying 
the [35 U.S.C.] section 271(e)(1) exemption. The purpose of the clinical trials 
exemption is to expedite the arrival of generic drugs on the market upon the 
expiration of a patent”.159 The Federal Circuit has held that nine months is too 
remote.160 However, courts have recognized the importance of having 
infringement questions answered at their earliest possible stage, and that FDA 
approval is good cause for bringing a declaratory judgment action regarding 
infringement claims.161 
Glaxo, Inc. v. Novopharm, Ltd. is a case in which the requirements for 
standing to bring a declaratory judgment action were met.162 In Glaxo, the Federal 
Circuit agreed that, although the plaintiff was currently shielded from liability 
under 35 U.S.C. § 271(e)(1), the court could still hear the plaintiff’s action where 
FDA approval was imminent and there was evidence that the defendant was 
preparing to import its product while there was a patent still in force.163  
In summary, courts have been reluctant to determine if future infringement 
would occur if FDA approval would be granted. This is because there is no 
                                                      
157 See Telectronics, 982 F.2d at 1527 (Fed. Cir. 1992) (“At the commencement of the suit, 
Ventritex's device had only recently begun clinical trials . . . . [T]he district court could have 
correctly ruled that the case lacked sufficient immediacy and reality to meet the actual controversy 
requirement under the Declaratory Judgment Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2201 (1988), and that it had no 
jurisdiction to hear the declaratory judgment count.”). 
158 See id. (“There was no certainty that the device when approved would be the same device 
that began clinical trials; product changes during testing are contemplated by statute, 21 U.S.C. § 
360(j)(g)(w)(C)(iii) (1988) . . . .”). 
159 Amgen, Inc. v. Hoechst Marion Roussel, Inc., 3 F. Supp. 2d 104, 112 (D. Mass. 1998); see 
also Telectronics, 982 F.2d at 1525 (“By permitting the testing and regulatory approval process to 
begin well before a controlling patent had run its course, Congress must have intended to allow 
competitors to be in a position to market their products as soon as it was legally permissible.”). 
160 Lang v. Pac. Marine & Supply Co., 895 F.2d 761, 764 (Fed. Cir. 1990) (“Here, Lang failed 
to meet the actual controversy requirement necessary to maintain Count I under the Declaratory 
Judgment Act. The accused infringing ship's hull would not be finished until at least 9 months 
after the complaint was filed.”). 
161 See Amgen, 3 F. Supp. 2d at 113 (outlining the warning that “[t]here may be . . . events 
prior to FDA approval that would constitute good cause”). 
162 110 F.3d 1562 (Fed. Cir. 1997). 
163 Id. at 1571.  
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guarantee that the product approved would be the same as that applied for—the 
FDA process is long and there is no guarantee that approval will be granted at all. 
To make a statement on such a device that it is immune from infringement under 
35 U.S.C. § 271(e)(1) could undermine the policy behind the statute. However, 
courts have recognized that FDA approval, especially when combined with other 
compelling circumstances, can be sufficient cause to bring a declaratory judgment 
suit against a potential infringer.164 
In the end, there is no liability for infringement for simply seeking and getting 
FDA approval. A successful declaratory judgment claim in situations such as 
these would result in a court ruling on whether or not using the product in the 
approved way would constitute infringement. This is not a determination that one 
is liable for induced infringement if a customer uses the device for the approved 
use. However, in all likelihood, such a situation would be sufficient to conclude 
that the customer was induced to infringe. The requisite intent needed to prove 
induced infringement would come from the indications and usage and the 
instructions for use. 
B. What Declaratory Judgments Mean for Morse  
Morse will be able to apply for FDA approval of Edison’s patented method of 
use as soon as he is able and ready to do so. He will be able to undercut some of 
Edison’s sales through the clinical trials required to gain FDA approval, as long as 
he is careful not to use the catheter for Edison’s use after he is no longer shielded 
under 35 U.S.C. § 271(e)(1). After he gets approval and abstains from promoting 
the device for Edison’s patented use, Edison can sue for a declaratory judgment 
on the grounds that if the device were used in the approved manner, then that act 
is an infringing one. This is fine by Morse who knows that all of the clinicians 
that helped him gain FDA approval, all of the trade shows he attended, and all of 
the fund raising events he held, are all indirect promotions for utilizing his device 
for Edison’s popular method of use.165 Morse can leverage this power by getting 
as many people involved in the FDA approval process as reasonably possible to 
still be under the protection of 35 U.S.C. § 271(e)(1). 
VI. SUMMARY 
Edison obtained a patent and FDA approval for a method of using a medical 
device that turned out to be popular and lucrative enough for Morse to desire 
entry into the market to undercut some of Edison’s sales. Morse learned that he 
can apply for approval to market a different method of using the same catheter 
that Edison’s patented method uses and promote the use of that catheter for a use 
                                                      
164 See id.; see supra note 161 and accompanying text.  
165 See supra Part III.C. 
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that is different from Edison’s without being liable for infringement. If Morse 
learns that physicians are using the catheters that he is selling for Edison’s use, he 
will likely not be liable to Edison if he is careful not to promote the catheter for 
Edison’s patented method. In fact, it is unlikely Edison will be able to sustain an 
induced infringement claim, because Morse likely failed to exhibit the requisite 
intent to induce the physician to use the catheter in the infringing way. Moreover, 
any claims based on state tort claims, or fraud on the FDA, will likely be 
insufficient to sustain liability because of the strength of the learned intermediary 
doctrine and the preemptory power of the MDA. To gain a further foothold on 
Edison’s market, Morse can apply for FDA approval for Edison’s patented 
method and enjoy protection under 35 U.S.C. § 271(e)(1). Thus, he will be able to 
undercut some of Edison’s sales and be poised to promote his catheter for 
Edison’s patented use the day that the patent expires. The end result is that 
Edison's ability to exercise his right to exclude others from using his method of 
using the catheter is limited by 35 U.S.C. § 271(e)(1), the doctrines of off-label 
use, the learned intermediary doctrine, and 21 C.F.R. § 360(k) that preempts some 
state tort claims. 
VII. POSSIBLE SOLUTIONS TO THE REDUCED VALUATION OF METHOD OF USE 
MEDICAL DEVICE PATENTS 
One possible solution is that the FDA requires persons that are pursuing 
approval for using a medical device to affirmatively disclaim that their approved 
use does not include other uses of the same device. This requirement could be 
readily visible in the labeling of the device sold by the manufacturer and visible to 
the physicians that are using the device. However, this solution, by affirmatively 
disclaiming other uses of the device, is implicitly recognizing the other approved 
uses of the device. Thus, this proposed solution may have the opposite effect than 
that which is desired, that is, the proposed solution may actually encourage the 
device to be used for other methods. This is especially true given the FDA’s 
refusal to regulate the medical practice, and a court’s recognition of the propriety 
and value of off-label uses. 
A better way to curb the negative effects on the valuation of the method of 
using a medical device is to recognize medical devices as being covered by the 
Hatch-Waxman amendments, specifically recognizing a pseudo-infringement suit 
for filing a 510(k) FDA application for a method of using a medical device that 
has already been approved, and is patented. This would allow courts to declare 
that the FDA approval being sought would be an act of infringement if the 
approval sought was actually carried through. This would basically allow courts a 
more lenient immediacy requirement in deciding whether they have jurisdiction to 
hear a declaratory judgment action. In doing so, courts, combined with the FDA, 
may be able to curb the effect of 35 U.S.C. § 271(e)(1), which allows a 
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manufacturer to indirectly promote a product for infringing uses through clinical 
trial studies. However, this curbing effect comes at the cost of more FDA 
regulation. The FDA would be required to provide something akin to the Orange 
Book used for pharmaceutical drugs for medical devices, and also, it would likely 
create more litigation. 
Regardless of whether any of the possible solutions presented are 
implemented, it is clear that those seeking a patent on a method of using a medical 
device should secure proper counsel in drafting their patent and pursuing FDA 
approval. The claims of the patent should be drafted, as much as possible, such 
that a single, direct infringer could infringe the method without an easy work 
around. Such claim drafting techniques can help avoid the intent and knowledge 
requirements that are required to prove multi-party induced infringement. In 
pursuing FDA approval of a patented method, competent counsel should be 
employed to oversee the paperwork and clinical testing results submitted for FDA 
approval to make sure that the actions fall under the 35 U.S.C. § 271(e)(1) shield. 
Also, when it is known that a medical device has a patented off-label use, it is 
critical that the manufacturer refrain from promoting that use of the medical 
device. Competent counsel will be able to help the manufacturer take steps to 
avoid such claims, such as by providing some proper disclaimers and possible 
language to use in promoting the device to avoid promoting the device for the off-
label use. In this way, the minefield that is the legal landscape for methods of 
using medical devices can be navigated more safely and efficiently.  
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